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We present a programme of research for pluralist formalisations — formalisations that
involve proving results in more than one foundation.
A foundation consists of two parts: a logical part that provides a notion of inference, and
a non-logical part that provides the entities to be reasoned about. A logic-enriched type
theory (LTT) is a formal system composed of such two separate parts. We show how
LTTs may be used as the basis for a pluralist formalisation.
We show how different foundations may be formalised as LTTs, and also describe a new
method for proof reuse. If we know that a translation Φ exists between logic-enriched
type theories (LTTs) S and T , and we have formalised a proof of a theorem α in S, we
may wish to make use of the fact that Φ(α) is a theorem of T . We show how this is
sometimes possible by writing a proof script MΦ. For any proof script Mα that proves a
theorem α in S, if we change Mα so it first imports MΦ, then the resulting proof script
will still parse, and will be a proof of Φ(α) in T .
In this paper, we focus on the logical part of an LTT-framework and show how the above
method of proof reuse is done for four cases of Φ: inclusion, the double negation
translation, the A-translation, and the Russell-Prawitz modality. This work has been
carried out using the proof assistant Plastic.
1. Introduction
When formalising a piece of mathematics, we must first choose a foundation — a formal
language in which the mathematical entities can be defined, and theorems and proofs
about these entities can be written. Usually, such a foundation consists of two parts: a
non-logical part for defining the mathematical entities to be reasoned about, and a logical
part that formalises the underlying logical inference (e.g., a system of logic with a set of
axioms and rules of deduction that determines which proofs are valid)
Much mathematical work involves working with more than one foundation: compar-
ing the theorems that are provable in each, defining translations between foundations,
comparing the class of models of each foundation, etc.
For example, work in set theory often involves comparing several different set theories
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and the theorems that can be proven in each. Similar work compares the theorems
provable in different fragments of first-order arithmetic (Ha´jek and Pudla´k, 1998). The
large research project known as Reverse Mathematics uses several systems of second-order
arithmetic (Simpson, 1999), and similar work has been done in higher-order arithmetic
(Kohlenbach, 2005).
In this paper, we propose a programme of research for conducting pluralist formalisa-
tions — formalisations of pieces of mathematics that involve more than one foundation.
The prevailing paradigm in the formalisation of mathematics so far has been to choose
one foundation, implement a proof assistant that constructs formal proofs in that foun-
dation, and proceed to build up a large library of formalised results in that foundation.
Some proof assistants offer the choice of a small number of different foundations — for
example, LEGO (Pollack, 1994) implements four, and Coq (Coq, 2004) offers the user
the choice of whether Set should be predicative or impredicative.
There are also proof assistants that implement logical frameworks, such as Isabelle
(Paulson, 1994) and the Edinburgh LF (Harper et al., 1987; Harper et al., 1993) as
implemented in Twelf (Pfenning and Schu¨rmann, 1999). These allow more than one
foundation to be represented, and often provide support for representing and reasoning
about relations and translations between foundations.
If we wish to formalise a large piece of mathematics that involves proving results in
several different foundations, it will be essential that we can reuse proofs carried out in
one foundation within another. We shall therefore investigate the following questions:
What must a logical framework provide in order to be suitable for a pluralist formalisa-
tion? How should we represent the different foundations within this logical framework?
And how can we reuse a proof script written in one foundation when working in another?
Our answer to the second question is that the foundations should be represented as
logic-enriched type theories (LTTs). We shall argue that LTTs possess some advantages
over other systems of logic for the purposes of a pluralist formalisation. Our method of
proof reuse relies on the two systems in question being declared in a fairly similar way.
Thus, when choosing a family of systems with which to conduct a pluralist formalisation,
we require one that will allow for a uniform presentation and treatment of a large number
of different foundations. LTTs provide such a uniform framework.
We shall present a logical framework suitable for representing LTTs, discuss several
issues in the construction of LTTs, and present a method for proof reuse between LTTs.
The method of proof reuse that we present is quite general: we shall show with sev-
eral quite varied examples how, given a translation from one foundation S to another
foundation T , we are able to take proof scripts in S and reuse them when working in T .
We work with LTTs in this paper, but our method is also usable with type theories,
systems of first-order logic, etc. It should therefore be useful to people working in many
different areas of the formalisation of mathematics.
It is important to note that the LTT-approach to formalisation involves formalisation
of the non-logical entities as well as that of the underlying logic. Traditionally, the studies
of a logical framework such as Edinburgh LF or the system Twelf have mainly focused
on the formal representations of logical systems and usually pay less attention to the
non-logical parts of a mathematical system. The LTT-approach is different: it takes the
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formalisation of the non-logical entities seriously and this is also a key part of the pluralist
approach to formalisation and proof reuse. We shall discuss this issue, although the focus
of the current paper is mainly on the logical part of the LTT-approach.
There has not been much work on pluralist formalisations in the literature, but there
has been quite a lot of research into the related problem of sharing results produced using
different proof assistants. We discuss this work in Section 6.1.
1.1. Outline
In Section 2, we shall discuss some general issues around the formalisation of mathematics
using more than one foundation. The type-theoretic framework of LTTs is introduced in
Section 3. In Section 4, we shall describe our method for proof reuse in more detail and,
in Section 5, the method is applied to four examples and it is shown how these have been
formalised using the proof assistant Plastic.
2. A Pluralist Approach to the Formalisation of Mathematics
2.1. Mathematics with Different Foundations
When building a foundational system for mathematics, one faces various choices. For
example, two of the decisions that must be made are: whether the logic shall be classical
or intuitionistic; and whether impredicative definitions are allowed, or only predicative.
Each of the four possible combinations of these options has been advocated as a foun-
dation for mathematics at some point in history.
— Impredicative classical mathematics. This is arguably the way in which the vast
majority of practising mathematicians work. Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory (ZF) is
one such foundation. The proof checker Mizar (Muzalewski, 1993) has been used to
formalise a very large body of impredicative classical mathematics. The foundation
HOL, as implemented in the proof assistants Isabelle (Nipkow et al., 2002) and HOL-
Light (Harrison, 1996), is another.
— Impredicative constructive mathematics. Impredicative types theories such as
ECC/UTT (Luo, 1994) and CIC (Bertot and Caste´ran, 2004) are examples of such
foundations. These have been implemented by the proof checkers LEGO (Luo and
Pollack, 1992) and Coq (Coq, 2004). There are also impredicative constructive set
theories, such as Intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel (IZF).
— Predicative classical mathematics. This was the approach taken by Weyl in his
influential monograph of 1918, Das Kontinuum (Weyl, 1918). Stronger predicative
classical systems have been investigated by Feferman (Feferman, 2005) and Schu¨tte
(Schu¨tte, 1965).
— Predicative constructive mathematics. Its foundations are provided, for exam-
ple, by Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory (Nordstro¨m et al., 1990; Martin-Lo¨f, 1984), whose
variants are implemented in the proof assistants Agda (Agda, 2008) and NuPRL
(Constable et al., 1986). There are also predicative constructive set theories, such as
Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (CZF).
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The two choices listed above are by no means the only ones that must be considered
when designing a foundation. We must also consider whether equality should be inten-
sional or extensional; which choice principles should be allowed; etc. A wide variety of
mathematical foundations are in use today.
One foundation may sometimes be an extension of another. For example, ZF is an
extension of IZF; that is, everything provable in IZF is provable in ZF. There can also be
translations between these system, such as the double negation translation (Go¨del, 1933)
from the classical system Peano Arithmetic to the intuitionistic Heyting Arithmetic.
When beginning a pluralist formalisation, we must consider how the several different
formalisations involved can be captured by a family of formal systems, in a manner that
is uniform enough for proof reuse to be practicable. As we have argued elsewhere (Adams
and Luo, 2010), logic-enriched type theories are able to capture a remarkably wide range
of foundations very faithfully, in a very uniform manner.
2.2. Proof Reuse in Logic-Enriched Type Theories
In this paper, we shall present a method for proof reuse. Suppose we have two foundations
S and T , and a translation from S to T . When we are working in T , we want to be able
to reuse proof scripts formalising results in S.
Further, we shall be greedy. We do not want to prove a lemma relating S and T , and
then have to apply that lemma many times. We do not want to write a program that
will automatically translate an S-proof script into a T -proof script. We want to be able
to take an S-proof script and reuse it — immediately, without any modification — as a
T -proof script.
There are two particular situations that we wish to consider:
1 We have two foundations S and T , and S is a subsystem of T . If we have shown that
S ` α, then we can immediately make use of the fact that T ` α. When formalising
a piece of mathematics that makes use of this sort of step, we wish to take a proof
script that formalises a proof of α in S, and use this script to provide us with a proof
of α when working in T .
2 More generally, we have two foundations S and T , and a translation Φ:S → T ; that
is, a mapping from the language of S to the language of T such that, if S ` α, then
T ` Φ(α). When formalising a piece of mathematics that makes use of this sort of
step, we wish to take a proof script that formalises a proof of α in S, and use this
script to provide us with a proof of Φ(α) when working in T .
Case 1 is a special case of case 2, where the translation Φ is the inclusion from S to T .
We shall be working in this paper with logic-enriched type theories (LTTs). These
are systems of logic that consist of a type theory, that defines the mathematical ob-
jects we will be dealing with, and a separate logical component, for stating and proving
propositions about those objects.
In case 1 above, we can sometimes arrange it so that LTTS , which represents S, is
a subsystem of the LTTT , which represents T . Suppose we have proof scripts MS and
MT that define LTTS and LTTT , respectively. If a proof script imports MS and proves
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Fig. 1. Proof Reuse Between Two LTTs
a theorem α, the proof script will still parse if we change it to import MT instead. This
idea was made use of in (Adams and Luo, 2010), where we proved several results in
the predicative LTTW , and were able to immediately reuse those proof scripts in an
impredicative LTT that extends LTTW .
However, such an approach is quite fragile; it depends on us using the same names for
constants in MS and MT . It is not certain that we can always define LTTS and LTTT in
such a way that LTTS is a subsystem of LTTT . Moreover, this approach cannot handle
the more general case 2 above.
The approach we present in this paper is as follows. Suppose we have a translation Φ
from LTTS to LTTT . Given proof scripts MS and MT that define LTTS and LTTT , we
shall construct a proof script MΦ that imports MT , and then defines every constant that
was declared in MS (see Fig. 1).
A proof script Mα that imports MS will still parse if we change it to import MΦ
instead. Further, we can write MΦ in such a way that, if Mα provides a proof of α under
MS , then it provides a proof of Φ(α) under MΦ.
We shall show in this paper how this can be done when LTTS is a subsystem of LTTT ,
and in three other cases: the double-negation translation from classical to intuitionistic
logic; theA-translation from intuitionistic logic to itself; and the Russell-Prawitz modality
from first-order logic (classical or intuitionistic) to second-order logic.
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3. A Type-Theoretic Framework for Pluralist Formalisations
Our approach to pluralist formalisations is based on a uniform framework in which math-
ematics with different foundations can be formalised. For this purpose, the type-theoretic
framework of Logic-enriched Type Theories (LTTs) is particularly appropriate.
Logic-enriched type theories were first studied by Aczel and Gambino to investigate
type-theoretic interpretations of constructive set theory (Aczel and Gambino, 2002; Gam-
bino and Aczel, 2006). An LTT is a formal system consisting of a type-theoretic component
that provides types and terms; and a logical component that provides propositions and
proofs. The intention is that the types and terms describe the collection of mathematical
objects we are concerned with, and the logical component to reason about those objects.
We shall present three logical frameworks in this section: LF, a Church-typed version of
Martin-Lo¨f’s Logical Framework†, and its two extensions LF′, intended for representing
an LTT, and LFLTT intended for representing several LTTs simultaneously.
The type-theoretic framework is a method of specifying LTTs within a logical frame-
work. The LTTs specifiable this way are capable of expressing a wide spectrum of founda-
tions for mathematics in a uniform way. It was first proposed in (Luo, 2006)‡. In (Adams
and Luo, 2007; Adams and Luo, 2010), the authors studied one of the systems in this
framework — a logic-enriched type theory LTTW that gives a modern type-theoretic
version of Weyl’s system for predicative mathematics — and used LTTW to formalise
Weyl’s predicative mathematics (Weyl, 1918) in the proof assistant Plastic.
In this section, we shall review the logical framework LF and its extension LF′. We then
introduce its extension LFLTT, and describe how LFLTT may be used to specify LTTs.
We then present the type-theoretic framework, and give examples of logic-enriched type
theories that can be specified in the framework.
3.1. The Logical Framework LF
A logical framework, such as Martin-Lo¨f’s logical framework (Nordstro¨m et al., 1990)
and its Church-typed version LF (Luo, 1994), is a dependent type system, together with
a method for representing other formal systems within that type system.
Here, we introduce LF briefly and fix our notations. The full details of LF, including
its rules, can be found in Chapter 9 of (Luo, 1994).
3.1.1. Basic Constructions The system LF deals with kinds, and objects. The kinds are:
— Type — the kind of types;
— El(A) — the kind of objects of type A; and
† The framework LF should not be confused with the Edinburgh Logical Framework (Harper et al.,
1987; Harper et al., 1993), which is also called LF. (It is unfortunate that the same name is used for
both.) One of the main differences between LF and the Edinburgh LF is that the former system is
intended to be used to specify type theories, and hence allows computation rules to be declared.
‡ LF has a variant called PAL+ (Luo, 2003), where applications are fully applied or saturated. In (Luo,
2006), we adopted the notations of PAL+; but this is inessential and we shall use LF and the associated
notations in this paper.
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The formation rule for N
N : Type
The introduction rules for N (constructors)
0 : N
succ : (N)N
The elimination rule over types for N
ENT : ( C : (N)Type )
( c : C(0) ) ( f : (n:N)(x:C(n))C(succ(n)) )
( z : N ) C(z)
The computation rules for N
ENT (C, c, f, 0) = c : C(0)
ENT (C, c, f, succ(n)) = f(n, ENT (C, c, f, n)) : C(succ(n))
Fig. 2. The type of natural numbers.
— (x:K)K ′ — the kind of dependent functional operations f which can be applied
to any object k of kind K to form the application fk of kind [k/x]K ′.
We often omit El and write El(A) simply as A. We write K → K ′ for (x:K)K ′ when x
does not occur free in K ′.
When writing objects in the form of application, we shall sometimes write f(a1, ..., an)
for fa1...an, and often use the infix-form of binary operators: for instance, we write A×B
and P ∧Q for ×(A,B) and ∧(P,Q), respectively.
Two objects are definitionally equal in LF if they are βη-convertible.
The system LF is intended for specifying type theories that deal with types and terms.
The intention is that:
— the types are represented by the objects of kind Type;
— the terms of type A are represented by the objects of kind El(A);
— the objects of kind (x:K)K ′ represent meta-functions on the type theory’s syntax.
3.1.2. Specification of Type Theories A type theory is specified in LF by declaring con-
stants, each with a kind; and computation rules. These declarations have the effect of
extending LF with additional rules (see (Luo, 1994) for the details).
Typically, a type in a type theory comes with its rules of formation, introduction,
elimination and computation. We represent this type in LF by declaring constants cor-
responding to the formation, introduction and elimination rules; and declaring equality
rules corresponding to the computation rules.
For example, the type N of natural numbers can be specified as in Figure 2 where, for
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instance, the following introduction rule
Γ ` n : N
Γ ` succ(n) : N
is specified by means of the declaration of the constant succ.
By this method, LF can specify type theories that contain inductive and co-inductive
types, predicative and impredicative universes, inductive-recursive types, and others.
3.2. Logic-enriched Type Theories
The system LF is a suitable language for specifying type theories which deal with just
types and terms. There is a single kind Type of all the types in the type theory.
If we wish to use a system to state and prove mathematical theorems, we must have
some way of introducing logical propositions. In a type theory, one may do this by
identifying propositions with types (e.g., in Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory, every proposition
is a type and vice versa) or by taking propositions as types, but not vice versa (e.g., in
ECC/UTT (Luo, 1994), every proposition is a type, but not every type is a proposition).
However, if one takes the view that logical propositions and data types should be
completely separate, then one will wish to work in a different kind of system; and LF
will not be adequate for specifying this different kind of system.
Logic-enriched type theories (LTTs) (Gambino and Aczel, 2006) are formal systems
where there is a complete separation between (logical) propositions and (data) types.
The syntax of an LTT consists of four categories of expression: types, terms, propositions,
and proofs (or derivations).
An LTT thus naturally falls into two components, or ‘worlds’: the type-theoretic com-
ponent, and the logical component. This allows for a lot of flexibility in the design of
an LTT, as we can change one component without affecting the other (e.g. we can add
excluded middle to the logical component, without changing the type-theoretic compo-
nent). This makes LTTs suitable for capturing many different mathematical foundations.
The two components do, however, interact. The logical world may depend on the
type-theoretic world: for example, given an inductive type such as N or List(A), we may
choose to introduce a rule of deduction allowing propositions to be proved by induction.
In order to specify an LTT adequately, an extension of LF is called for. This extended
logical framework is obtained by extending LF by adding a new kind Prop, that stands
for the world of logical propositions, and a new kind constructor Prf :
Γ valid
Γ ` Prop kind
Γ ` P : Prop
Γ ` Prf(P ) kind
This extended framework was first proposed in (Luo, 2006) and further studied in (Adams
and Luo, 2010) and, in the latter paper, we have called it LF ′.
The intention is that:
— the types are represented by the objects of kind Type;
— the terms of type A are represented by the objects of kind El (A);
— the propositions are represented by the objects of kind Prop;
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Conjunction
∧ : (Prop)(Prop)Prop
∧I : (P : Prop)(Q : Prop) (Prf(P ))(Prf(Q))Prf(P ∧Q)
∧E1 : (P : Prop)(Q : Prop) (Prf(P ∧Q))Prf(P )
∧E2 : (P : Prop)(Q : Prop) (Prf(P ∧Q))Prf(Q)
Universal quantifier
∀ : (A : Type)(P : (A)Prop)Prop
∀I : (A : Type)(P : (A)Prop) ((x:A)Prf(P (x))) Prf(∀(A,P ))
∀E : (A : Type)(P : (A)Prop) (Prf(∀(A,P ))) (a : A)Prf(P (a))
Negation
¬ : (Prop)Prop
DN : (P : Prop) (Prf(¬¬P ))Prf(P )
... ... ...
Fig. 3. Logical operators and direct proofs in the classical FOL.
— the proofs of a proposition P are represented by the objects of kind Prf(P ).
An LTT is specified in LF ′ by declaring constants and computation rules. Each dec-
laration has the effect of extending LF ′ with new rules; see (Adams and Luo, 2010).
3.2.1. Logics. The logic in an LTT is specified by declaring constants for the logical
operators and the associated rules.
For example, say we wish an LTT’s logical component to consist of classical first-order
logic in their logical part. This can be introduced by declaring the constants that stand
for the logical operators, and constants that stand for the associated inference rules. The
logical operators ∧, ∀ and ¬ and some of their associated rules of inference are specified
in Figure 3. Other logical operators can be introduced in a similar way.
3.2.2. Remarks
1 The quantifier ∀ declared here can only be used to quantify over a type; that is, for
a formula ∀(A,P ), or ∀x:A,P (x) in the usual notation, A must be a type.
In particular, since Prop is not a type (it is a kind), one cannot form a proposition
by quantifying over Prop. Higher-order logical quantification such as ∀X:Prop.X, as
found in impredicative type theories such as System F (Girard, 1986) and the Calculus
of Constructions (Coquand and Huet, 1988), is not possible with this constant.
Similarly, since propositions are not types (Prf(P ) is a kind, not a type), one cannot
quantify over the proofs of a proposition, either.
When designing an LTT, we can thus choose whether to allow first- or higher-order
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quantification. Contrast this situation with a type theory such as ECC or UTT (Luo,
1994), where it would not be possible to restrict quantification to the datatypes, since
Prop is a type and every proposition is a type.
2 An LTT is specified in the framework, not just by specifying a collection of constants,
but also by specifying computation rules. Computation rules are needed in the type-
theoretic component for specifying inductive data types, universes, etc. Computation
rules in the logical component are also sometimes needed; they were used, for example,
in (Adams and Luo, 2010) in the specification of typed sets.
The ability to specify computation rules is the most important difference between the
Martin-Lo¨f family of logical frameworks, including LF and LF ′, and the Edinburgh
LF (Harper et al., 1993).
3 If we have introduced a universe that contains the empty type and the type of natural
numbers, we can then prove, internally in the type-theoretic framework, that Peano’s
fourth axiom for natural numbers holds (i.e., the proposition ∀x:N.(s[x] 6=N 0) holds).
This is similar to Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory, where without the presence of a type
universe, one cannot prove Peano’s fourth axiom internally (Smith, 1988).
3.3. The Type-Theoretic Framework
The type-theoretic framework is a method for specifying LTTs using a type system such as
LF′. It was introduced in (Luo, 2006). The LTTs specifiable in the type-theoretic frame-
work are all defined and specified in a uniform way, but should be capable of expressing a
wide range of different mathematical foundations. The type-theoretic framework is thus
especially suitable as the basis for a pluralist formalisation.
One specifies an LTT within the type-theoretic framework by:
1 Declaring a number of inductive types and inductive families of types.
Besides N , other examples of inductive types include those of lists, vectors, trees,
ordinals, dependent functions and dependent pairs. In general, inductive types can be
generated by inductive schemata as studied in, for example, (Dybjer, 1991; Coquard
and Paulin-Mohring, 1990; Luo, 1994).
2 Declaring a number of type universes: types that whose objects are (names of) types.
For example, a universe U of ‘small types’ can be introduced as
U : Type and T : (U)Type;
An inductive type may have a name in U : e.g. we may have nat as a name of N :
nat : U and T (nat) = N : Type.
Notice that such a universe is predicative, in the sense that it only contains types that
do not involve U itself. The general way of introducing predicative type universes can
be found in (Martin-Lo¨f, 1984). Impredicative universes, such as that of propositions
in UTT (Luo, 1994, p.175), can also be specified in the type-theoretic framework.
3 Declaring a number of logical connectives and their associated rules of deduction.
We may introduce some or all of the propositional connectives, first- or higher-order
A Pluralist Approach to the Formalisation of Mathematics 11
quantifiers, and other logical connectives (such as equality). The rules of deduction
may be those of classical logic, constructive logic, minimal logic, etc.
4 Declaring one or more propositional universes (Adams and Luo, 2010).
5 Declaring the induction rules for each inductive data type.
An LTT may contain some data types and usually they are inductively defined, exactly
the way as inductive types are specified in LF (see Section 3.1). For each inductive
type in the LTT, there is an associated induction rule for proving properties of the
objects of that type.
For example, an LTT may contain the type N of natural numbers as specified in
Figure 2 in Section 3.1. Associated with N , there is an associated induction rule
given by the following constant ENP with associated rule
Γ ` P : (N)Prop Γ ` c : P (0) Γ ` f : (x:N)(P (x))P (succ(x)) Γ ` n : N
Γ ` ENP (P, c, f, n) : P (n)
Note that, when read as a rule of proof, the above is just the rule of induction over
natural numbers.
Therefore, associated with each inductive type, there are two elimination operators:
ET and EP (for N , they are ENT and ENP ). Note that the elimination operator over
types, ET , has associated computation rules (e.g., the computation rules for ENT in
Figure 2), while the elimination operator over propositions, EP , does not.§
We may introduce rules for induction over the whole of Prop as above, or over just
one propositional universe.
The induction rules connect the world of logical propositions (formally represented
by Prop) and that of the data types (formally represented by Type). Quantifications
over types allow one to form propositions to express logical properties of data and
the induction rules to prove those properties.
6 Introducing types of typed sets.
For each type A, we can introduce a type Set(A) of all sets of objects of type A.
This type’s canonical objects have the form {x:A | φ}, where φ is a proposition. This
allows us to introduce sets in an impredicative way (if φ may range over the whole
of Prop), as in ordinary mathematics, or a predicative way (if φ ranges only over a
small universe of propositions, as in predicative mathematics; see, e.g., (Feferman,
2005)). (For further and formal details, see (Luo, 2006; Adams and Luo, 2010)).
Such a notion of typed set, together with the possibility of representing the classical
first-order logic, allows us to formalise classical predicative mathematics in the type-
theoretic framework (Weyl, 1918; Adams and Luo, 2010) as well as impredicative
mathematics (cf., the discussion on mathematical pluralism in Section 2).
3.3.1. Remarks
§ For the elimination operators over propositions, it is optional whether they have associated compu-
tation rules, similar to those for the elimination operators over types. Including or excluding these
computation rules will not affect the type-theoretic component (since types and terms may not depend
on proofs) or which propositions are provable.
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1 Separation of propositions and types The type-theoretic framework has an im-
portant salient feature: there is a clear separation between logical propositions and
data types. In Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory, for example, types and propositions are iden-
tified. The second author has argued, for instance in the development of ECC/UTT
(Luo, 1994), that it is unnatural to identify logical propositions with data types and
there should be a clear distinction between the two. This is part of the philosophy
behind the development of the type theories ECC and UTT, where data types are
not propositions, although logical propositions are types.
Logic-enriched type theories have gone one step further (as compared with ECC/UTT)
— there is a complete separation between propositions and types. Logical proposi-
tions or their totality Prop are not regarded as types. This has led to a more flexible
treatment of logics.
2 Consistency and Adequacy. The consistency of an LTT formulated following the
above suggestions can be shown either by a direct proof (Goguen, 1994) or by an
indirect mapping between the LTT concerned to a known consistent type system. For
example, in (Luo, 2006), we map an LTT called LTT1 (classical FOL plus inductive
types) to MLTTe, an extension of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory with the excluded middle.
We show that LTT1 is consistent relative to MLTTe.
Such a relative consistency proof raises an interesting question: if Martin-Lo¨f’s type
theory extended with excluded middle is consistent, why use an LTT at all? Why
not just use MLTTe? One reason is that the meaning theory of type theory relies
on the property of canonicity : that every object reduces to a canonical object. This
makes it possible for us to provide a meaning theory in which an inductive type is
understood as consisting of its canonical objects (for example, the type of natural
numbers consists of zero and its successors).
The LTTs in the type-theoretic framework possess the property of canonicity, thanks
to the clear distinction between logical propositions and data types. The system
MLTTe does not; in MLTTe, every inductive type contains infinitely many non-
canonical objects. The type-theoretic framework hence provides an adequate treat-
ment of classical reasoning on the one hand, and a clean meaning-theoretic under-
standing of inductive types on the other.
3.4. Working with More than One LTT
We are concerned in this paper with formalisations that involve more than one LTT. We
must therefore extend the logical framework yet again.
If we wish to declare two LTTs simultaneously, called LTT1 and LTT2, say, then we
shall need the logical framework to possess the following kinds, besides the dependent
product kinds of the form (x:K)K ′:
Type1, El1 (k) , Prop1, Prf1(k), Type2, El2 (k) , Prop2, Prf2(k)
with the following rules of deduction:
Γ valid
Γ ` Type1kind
Γ ` A:Type1
Γ ` El1 (A) kind
Γ valid
Γ ` Prop1kind
Γ ` P :Prop1
Γ ` Prf1(P )kind
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Γ valid
Γ ` Type2kind
Γ ` A:Type2
Γ ` El2 (A) kind
Γ valid
Γ ` Prop2kind
Γ ` P :Prop2
Γ ` Prf2(P )kind
In the framework augmented with these kinds:
— the objects of kind Typei represent the types of LTTi;
— the objects of kind Eli (A) represent the terms of LTTi;
— the objects of kind Propi represent the propositions of LTTi;
— the objects of kind Prfi(A) represent the proofs of LTTi
The constants and computation rules in the declaration of LTT1 will therefore involve
only the kinds Type1, El1 (A), Prop1 and Prf1(A), and the product kinds built up from
these. When we are working in LTT1, we use only these kinds. Likewise, when declaring
or working in LTT2, we use only the kinds Type2, El2 (A), Prop2, Prf2(A), and the
product kinds built from these.
3.4.1. Logical Framework LFLTT We wish to give the user the ability to declare arbitrar-
ily many pairs (K,C) consisting of a top-kind K and a kind constructor C.
The effect of declaring the pair (K,C) is to extend the logical framework with the
following rules of deduction:
Γ valid
Γ ` Kkind
Γ ` k:K
Γ ` C(k)kind
Γ ` k = k′:K
Γ ` C(k) = C(k′)
In the above example, we would declare the pairs
(Type1, El1), (Type2, El2), (Prop1, P rf1), (Prop2, P rf2).
We note that there is no longer a need to have the kinds Type, El (A), Prop and
Prf(P ) as part of the primitive syntax. We therefore remove them. The user can rein-
troduce them if needed by declaring the topkind pairs (Type,El) and (Prop,Prf).
We call this new framework LFLTT. In summary: LFLTT is the framework LF, with
the kinds Type and El(k) removed, and with the ability to declare pairs (K,C) added.
3.5. Implementation
The proof assistant Plastic was first implement by Callaghan as an implementation of LF
(Callaghan and Luo, 2001). It was extended to an implementation of LF ′, and used in
the work to formalise Weyl’s predicative mathematics using the type-theoretic framework
(Adams and Luo, 2007; Adams and Luo, 2010).
Plastic allows the user to declare constants with commands such as c:K by [c:K]; to
define constants with commands such as [c= · · · :K]; and to construct objects using tactics
such as Intros and Refine. The user may also declare computation rules of a certain
form. Plastic automatically generates the constants and computation rules for inductive
types, but logical connectives, induction rules, universes and computation rules in the
logical component must be entered by hand.
For the work described in this paper, the first author is extending Plastic further to an
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implementation of LFLTT. The user may now declare a top-kind and constructor (K,C)
by entering the command Topkind K C;
We shall describe the Plastic implementations of several LTTs in Section 5 and how
they are used in studying pluralist formalisations and proof reuse.
4. Our Approach to Pluralist Formalisations
Our approach to pluralist formalisations is based on the concept of a translation:
Definition 4.1 (Translation). A translation Φ from an LTT S to an LTT T is a
mapping from the expressions of S to the expressions of T such that:
— if A is a type of S, then Φ(A) is a type of T ;
— if M is a term of type A in S, then Φ(M) is a term of type Φ(A) in T ;
— if P is a proposition of S, then Φ(P ) is a proposition of T ;
— if H is a proof of P in S, then Φ(H) is a proof of Φ(P ) in T .
Suppose we have a translation Φ from S to T . If α is a theorem of S, then Φ(α) is a
theorem of T . We wish to find a way to take a formalisation of a proof of α in S, and
use that proof script — without any modification — as a proof of Φ(α) in T .
Our approach is as follows(see Fig. 1). Let MS and MT be two proof scripts that
declare the constants and rules of deduction of S and T respectively. Let Mα be a proof
script that imports MS , and proves the theorem α.
We construct a proof script Mφ that imports MT , and then defines every symbol that
was declared as a constant in MS . If MS contains a constant declaration c:K, then MT
must define c to be an object of kind K. If MS declares the computation rule M B N ,
then we must ensure that M and N are convertible under the definitions in MT .
If both these conditions are met, then we know that the proof script Mα will parse if
we import Mφ instead of MS . Let us give the name Mφ(α) to the proof script with this
small change made (see Fig. 1).
Example 4.2. Let LTT1 be an LTT whose logical component consists of classical propo-
sitional logic with negation not and implication imp. Let LTT2 be an LTT whole logical
component consists of classical propositional logic with negation neg and disjunction or
(see Fig. 4). We shall write ∼ φ for not φ, φ ⊃ ψ for imp φ ψ, ¬φ for neg φ, and φ ∨ ψ
for or φ ψ.
It is known that implication can be defined in terms of disjunction and negation in
classical logic. This fact can be used to define a translation from LTT1 to LTT2:
[[∼ φ]] ≡ ¬ [[φ]] [[φ ⊃ ψ]] ≡ ¬ [[φ]] ∨ [[ψ]]
Let M1 and M2 be two proof scripts that consist of the constant declarations given in
Fig. 4 for LTT1 and LTT2 respectively. We now wish to write a proof script MΦ that
imports M2, and then defines every constant that was declared in M1.
The proof script Mφ begins as follows:
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LTT1 LTT2
Topkind Prop1 Prf1 Topkind Prop2 Prf2
not : Prop1 → Prop1 neg : Prop2 → Prop2
notI : (p, q:Prop1) negI : (p, q:Prop2)
(Prf1(p)→ Prf1(q))→ (Prf2(p)→ Prf2(q))→
(Prf1(p)→ Prf1(∼ q))→ (Prf2(p)→ Prf2(¬q))→
Prf1(∼ p) Prf2(¬q)
DNE : (p:Prop1)Prf1(∼∼ p)→ Prf1(p) DNNE : (p:Prop2)Prf2(¬¬p)→ Prf2(p)
imp : Prop1 → Prop1 → Prop1 or : Prop2 → Prop2 → Prop2
impI : (p, q:Prop1)(Prf1(p)→ Prf1(q))→ orIl : (p, q:Prop2)Prf2(p)→ Prf2(p ∨ q)
Prf1(p ⊃ q) orIr : (p, q:Prop2)Prf2(q)→ Prf2(p ∨ q)
impE : (p, q:Prop1)Prf1(p ⊃ q)→ orE : (p, q, r:Prop2)
Prf1(p)→ Prf1(q) (Prf2(p)→ Prf2(r))→
(Prf2(q)→ Prf2(r))→
Prf2(p ∨ q)→ Prf2(r)
Fig. 4. The logical components of LTT1 and LTT2
import M2;
[Prop1 = Prop2];
[Prf1 = Prf2];
[not = neg];
[notI = negI];
[DNE = DNNE];
We must now define imp. The definition is guided by (1) above:
[imp = [p, q:Prop1] ∼ p ∨ q];
We must now define objects impI and impE that have kinds
impI : (p, q:Prop1)(Prf1(p)→ Prf1(q))→ Prf1(p ⊃ q)
impE : (p, q:Prop1)Prf1(p ⊃ q)→ Prf1(p)→ Prf1(q)
i.e. impI : (p, q:Prop2)(Prf2(p)→ Prf2(q))→ Prf2(∼ p ∨ q)
impE : (p, q:Prop2)Prf2(∼ p ∨ q)→ Prf2(p)→ Prf2(q)
It is straightforward to construct these objects using a proof assistant like Plastic.
Now, suppose we have formalised a proof of the proposition α in LTT2. That is, suppose
we have a proof script that imports M2, and then constructs an object of kind Prf2(α).
If we change the script so it imports MΦ instead, then we know that the script shall still
parse; and the script shall now be a proof of [[α]] in LTT2.
For example, suppose that a script imports M2 that constructs an object of kind
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(p:Prop2)Prf2(p ⊃ p). We change the script to import MΦ instead. Under the definitions
in MΦ, we have
(p:Prop2)Prf2(p ⊃ p) = (p:Prop1)Prf1(∼ p ∨ p)
and so the script now constructs an object of kind (p:Prop1)Prf1(∼ p∨p). This is exactly
as required, since [[φ ⊃ φ]] ≡∼ [[φ]] ∨ [[φ]].
4.1. Remarks
1 Note that the construction of the module MΦ can be seen in one sense as a formali-
sation of the metatheorem that [[ ]] is sound, i.e. maps theorems to theorems.
2 Note that a translation between two LTTs may involve changing the logical world
(as in the examples in Sections 5.2–5.4 below), the datatype world (e.g. the inclusion
from LTTW to LTTI considered in (Adams and Luo, 2010)) or both.
5. Case Studies in Formalisation
We now describe several case studies in the use of this method of proof reuse that we
have carried out using the proof assistant Plastic. The source code for these examples is
available at http://www.cs.rhul.ac.uk/~robin/pluralism
5.1. Classical and Intuitionistic LTTs
For these examples, we shall assume that we have two LTTs: a classical LTT, LTTclass,
and an intuitionistic LTT, LTTint. We assume that these two LTTs have the same type-
theoretic component. The logical component of LTTclass is first-order classical logic with
the connectives eqC, notC, andC, orC, impC, allC and exC. The logical component of
LTTint is first-order intuitionistic logic with the connectives eqI, notI, andI, orI, impI,
allI and exI.
We write M =C N for eqC A M N , ¬Cφ for notC φ, φ∧C ψ for andC φ ψ, φ∨C ψ for
orC φ ψ, φ ⊃C ψ for impC φ ψ, ∀Cx:A.φ for allC A [x:A]φ, and ∃Cx:A.φ for exC A [x:A]φ.
Similarly, we write M =I N for eqI A M N , etc.
We have two proof scripts: MC that declares the constants and computation rules of
LTTclass, and MI that declares the constants and computation rules of LTTint. Some of
the declarations are given in Fig. 5. Note that, apart from the different names for the
constants, the only difference between the two scripts is the inclusion of ¬C¬CE in MC .
We shall omit the subscripts C and I when no confusion may result.
5.2. Inclusion
If an LTT L1 is a subsystem of the LTT L2, then we can easily reuse proof scripts from
L1 as proof scripts in L2. The mapping Φ here is the inclusion mapping.
For example, LTTint is a subsystem of LTTclass. We can easily write a module MItoC
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MC MI
Topkind TypeC ElC Topkind TypeI ElI
Topkind PropC PrfC Topkind PropI PrfI
eqC : (A:TypeC)A→ A→ PropC eqI : (A:TypeI)A→ A→ PropI
eqCI : (A:TypeC)(a:A)PrfC(a =C a) eqII : (A:TypeI)(a:A)PrfC(a =I a)
eqCE : (A:TypeC)(P :A→ PropC) eqIE : (A:TypeI)(P :A→ PropI)
(a, b:A) (a, b:A)
PrfC(a =C b)→ PrfC(Pa)→ PrfI(a =I b)→ PrfI(Pa)→
PrfC(Pb) PrfI(Pb)
notC : PropC → PropC notI : PropI → PropI
notCI : (p, q:PropC) notII : (p, q:PropI)
(PrfC(p)→ PrfC(q))→ (PrfI(p)→ PrfI(q))→
(PrfC(p)→ PrfC(¬Cq))→ (PrfI(p)→ PrfI(¬Iq))→
PrfC(¬Cp) PrfI(¬Iq)
notnotCE : (p:PropC)PrfC(¬C¬Cp)→
PrfC(p)
orC : PropC → PropC → PropC orI : PropI → PropI → PropI
orCIl : (p, q:PropC)PrfC(p)→ orIIl : (p, q:PropI)PrfI(p)→
PrfC(p ∨C q) PrfI(p ∨C q)
orCIr : (p, q:PropC)PrfC(q)→ orIIr : (p, q:PropI)PrfI(q)→
PrfC(p ∨C q) PrfI(p ∨I q)
orCE : (p, q, r:PropC) orIE : (p, q, r:PropI)
(PrfC(p)→ PrfC(r))→ (PrfI(p)→ PrfI(r))→
(PrfC(q)→ PrfC(r))→ (PrfI(q)→ PrfI(r))→
PrfC(p ∨C q)→ PrfC(r) PrfI(p ∨I q)→ PrfI(r)
Fig. 5. The partial scripts that declare LTTclass and LTTint
that describes the inclusion mapping (Fig. 6). Any code that parses under MC will also
parse under MItoC .
This form of proof reuse was used in the formalisation of Weyl’s predicative foundation
of mathematics (Adams and Luo, 2010). That formalisation involved two LTTs: the
predicative LTTW and an impredicative extension. We defined the real numbers in LTTW,
proved in LTTW the theorem that every set of rationals bounded above has a (real) least
upper bound, and then reused that proof to prove in the impredicative LTT that every
set of reals bounded above has a least upper bound.
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import MC
[TypeI = TypeC];
[ElI = ElC];
[PropI = PropC];
[PrfI = PrfC];
[notI = notC];
[notII = notCI];
[orI = orC];
...
Fig. 6. The Module MItoC
5.3. The Double Negation Translation
The double negation translation, or Go¨del-Gentzen negative translation (Go¨del, 1933) is
a mapping from classical logic to intuitionistic logic.
The mapping is defined thus:
α¬¬ ≡ ¬¬α (α atomic)
(¬φ)¬¬ ≡ ¬φ¬¬
(φ ∧ ψ)¬¬ ≡ φ¬¬ ∧ ψ¬¬
(φ ∨ ψ)¬¬ ≡ ¬(¬φ¬¬ ∧ ¬ψ¬¬)
(φ→ ψ)¬¬ ≡ φ¬¬ → ψ¬¬
(∀xφ)¬¬ ≡ ∀xφ¬¬
(∃xφ)¬¬ ≡ ¬∀x¬φ¬¬
To prove the soundness of the double negation translation, the most important step is
the following lemma, which is proved by induction on φ:
Lemma 5.1. For any formula φ, the formula φ¬¬ is stable; that is, ¬¬φ¬¬ ⊃ φ¬¬ is
provable in intuitionistic logic.
It is then quite straightforward to prove that, if φ is provable in classical logic, then
φ¬¬ is provable in intuitionistic logic, by induction on the derivation of φ. We wish to
write a proof script MDN that imports MI and then defines every constant that was
declared in MC .
5.3.1. First Attempt For our first attempt, we simply define
[TypeC = TypeI];
[ElC = ElI];
[PropC = PropI];
[PrfC = PrfI];
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and then define eqC, notC, etc. as follows:
[eqC = [A:TypeC] [a, b:A] ¬I¬I(a =I b)];
[notC = notI];
[orC = [p, q:PropC] ¬I(¬Ip ∧I ¬Iq)];
...
This module ‘maps’ formulas of LTTclass to their double-negation translation, in the
following sense: an expression that denotes an proposition φ in LTTclass will expand,
under these definitions, to an expression that denotes φ¬¬ in LTTint. For example, the
expression P ∨C ¬CP expands under the above definitions to ¬I(¬IP ∧I ¬I¬IP ).
However, this script will not work, as the kind of orCE is then (omitting the PrfIs):
(P,Q,R:PropI)(P → R)→ (Q→ R)→ ¬(¬P ∧ ¬Q)→ R
and this kind is uninhabited in LTTint.
This is because the corresponding rule of deduction
¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)
[φ]···
χ
[ψ]···
χ
χ
is not admissible in intuitionistic logic.
Looking at the proof of soundness, we see that we somehow need to use the fact that
φ¬¬ is always stable (Lemma 5.1). This gives us the idea for our second and successful
attempt:
5.3.2. Second Attempt We must map PropC , not to the kind of all propositions, but to
the kind of all stable propositions. Ideally, we would like to write
PropC = Σp:PropI .PrfI(¬I¬Ip ⊃I p) .
However, LFLTT does not at present have these Σ-kinds.
One option would be to extend LFLTT with Σ-kinds, or some similar feature. This is
an option that the authors intend to explore in the future.
As an alternative, we instead declare in MDN the kind PropC , the constructor PrfC ,
and the following introduction, elimination and computation rules:
[PropCI:(p:PropI)PrfI(¬I¬Ip ⊃I p)→ PropC];
[PI1:PropC → PropI];
[PI2:(p:PropC)PrfI(¬I¬I(PI1 p) ⊃I PI1 p)];
[PI1(PropCI p f) = p];
[PrfCI:(p:PropC)PrfI(PI1 p)→ PrfC(p)];
[PrfCE:(p:PropC)PrfC(p)→ PrfI(PI1 p)];
The constructor PrfC is defined as follows:
[PrfC = [p:PropC] PrfI(PI1 p)];
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We can now proceed to define the constants of MC . The connective ∨C , for example,
must now be defined as a binary function on this ‘Sigma-kind’:
orC : PropC → PropC → PropC
(p, f) ∨C (q, g) ≡ (¬I(¬Ip ∧I ¬Iq), h)
where h is a proof that ¬I(¬Ip ∧I ¬Iq) is stable.
Written out in full, we have
orC = [p, q:PropC ] PropCI (¬I(¬I(PI1 p) ∧I ¬I(PI1 q)) · · ·
where · · · elides a proof of
¬¬¬(¬(PI1 p) ∧ ¬(PI1 q)) ⊃ ¬(¬(PI1 p) ∧ ¬(PI1 q)) .
The kind of orCE expands under the above definitions to
(P,Q,R:PropC)(PrfI(P1)→ PrfI(R1))→ (PrfI(Q1)→ PrfI(R1))→
PrfI(¬I(¬IP1 ∧I ¬IQ1))→ PrfI(R1)
which is inhabited. The inhabitant we construct makes use of R2:PrfI(¬I¬IR1 ⊃I R1).
It is possible to define every constant in MC in this fashion. Any module that imports
MC will parse if it is changed to import MDN instead. We have:
— If an expression denotes a proposition φ under MC , then under MDN it denotes a
pair consisting of φ¬¬ and a proof that φ¬¬ is stable.
— If an expression denotes a proof P of φ under MC (i.e. P :PrfC(φ)), then under MDN
it denotes a proof of φ¬¬.
5.3.3. Application As an application of this work, we can show that, if LTTint is consis-
tent, then LTTclass is consistent. Suppose we had a proof script that imports MC , and
then constructs an object of type PrfC(⊥C). Then the same proof script could import
MDN instead, in which case it would construct an object of type PrfI(⊥I).
5.4. The A-translation
The A-translation (Friedman, 1978) is a mapping from intuitionistic logic to intuitionistic
logic. We fix a formula A, and then define the formula φA for every formula φ as follows:
PA ≡ P ∨A (P atomic)
(¬φ)A ≡ φA ⊃ A
(φ ∗ ψ)A ≡ φA ∗ ψA (∗ ≡ ∧,∨,⊃)
(Qxφ)A ≡ QxφA (Q ≡ ∀,∃)
This translation is sound: if φ is a theorem of an intuitionistic theory T , then so is φA
(Friedman, 1978). The important lemma in the proof of this theorem is:
Lemma 5.2. For any formula φ, we have ` A→ φA.
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We can make use of the A-translation for proof reuse as follows. We write two copies
of a script that defines LTTint, say MI and M
′
I :
MI M
′
I
Topkind PropI PrfI Topkind Prop
′
I Prf
′
I
eqI : (A:TypeI)A→ A→ PropI eqI′ : (A:Type′I)A→ A→ Prop′I
notI : PropI → PropI notI′ : Prop′I → Prop′I
andI : PropI → PropI → PropI andI′ : Prop′I → Prop′I → Prop′I
...
...
We construct our module MA that defines the A-translation as follows. We assume that
MI has been imported and an object A:PropI defined. We now define every constant
declared in M ′I . The constant Prop
′
I is defined to be the kind of all propositions φ:PropI
such that A ⊃ φ. Again, we would like to write:
Prop′I = Σp:PropI .PrfI(A ⊃I p)
Prf′I(φ, f) = PrfI(φ)
a =′I b = (a =I b ∨I A, · · · )
¬′I(φ, f) = (φ ⊃I A, · · · )
(φ, f) ∨′I (ψ, g) = (φ ∨I ψ, · · · )
...
But as LFLTT does not have Σ-kinds, we instead declare the kind Prop
′
I , the con-
structor Prf′I , and the following constants:
Prop′II : (p:PropI)PrfI(A ⊃I p)→ Prop′I
PI1 : Prop′II → PropI
PI2 : (p:Prop′I)PrfI(A ⊃I PI1 p)
PrfI2Prf
′
I : (p:PropI)(f :PrfI(A ⊃I p))Prf′I(Prop′II p f)→ PrfI(p)
Prf′I2PrfI : (p:PropI)(f :PrfI(A ⊃I p))PrfI(p)→ Prf′I(Prop′II p f)
a =′I b = Prop
′
II(a =I b ∨I A)(· · · )
¬′Ip = Prop′II(PI1 p ⊃I A)(· · · )
p ∨′I q = Prop′II(PI1 p ∨I PI1 q)(· · · )
and the computation rule PI1(Prop′II p f) = p:PropI .
Now any proof script beginning import M ′I ; will also parse if we replace this line with
import MI ;
[A = · · · : PropI];
import MA;
As an application of the A-translation, we can show that Markov’s law is admissible
for quantifier-free formulas:
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Theorem 5.3. Let T be an intuitionistic theory. If T ` ¬¬∃xφ, where φ is quantifier-free
(possibly with free variables other than x), then T ` ∃xφ.
Proof. Let A ≡ ∃xφ. If T ` ¬¬∃xφ then, by the soundness of the A-translation,
T ` (∃xφA → A)→ A.
Now, it is easy to show that φA ` φ ∨ A and φ ∨ A ` φA for φ quantifier-free. Thus,
we have T ` (∃x(φ ∨ A) → A) → A . We have ∃xφ → A and ∃xA → A, hence
T ` ∃x(φ ∨A)→ A, and so T ` A; i.e. T ` ∃xφ.
We can make use of this result as follows: given any proof of ¬′I¬′I∃xφ under M ′I , we
can obtain a proof of ∃xφ under MI .
Suppose we have a proof script Mα that imports M
′
I and proves ¬¬∃xφ:
import M ′I
...
[P′ = · · · :Prop′I];
Claim H:PrfI′(¬′I¬′I∃′Ix:T.P′x);
Proof
...
Qed
Then we can produce a proof script that imports MI and proves ∃xφ:
import MI ;
...
[P = · · · :PropI];
[A = ∃Ix:T.Px];
import Mα;
Claim K:PrfI(∃Ix:T.Px);
Proof
...
Qed
In this script, the line defining P (line 3) is the result of replacing ∧I′ with ∧I , ∨I′
with ∨I , etc. in line 6.
The proof K makes use of H, which is now a proof of ((∃Ix:T.(Px∨I A)) ⊃I A) ⊃I A.
5.4.1. Remark It is unsatisfactory to have to work in two copies of LTTint, and to have
separate definitions of P and P ′. We would like to be able to take a script that proves
¬¬∃xPx in LTTint, and produce a script that proves ∃xPx in LTTint. This requires a
more sophisticated module mechanism than the one that currently exists in Plastic.
A Pluralist Approach to the Formalisation of Mathematics 23
5.5. The Russell-Prawitz Modality
The following mapping from a first-order language to a second-order language, first in-
troduced in (Russell, 1903), was given the name of the Russell-Prawitz modality by Aczel
(Aczel, 2001).
[[P ]] ≡ P (P atomic)
[[¬φ]] ≡ ∀p. [[φ]] ⊃ p
[[φ ∧ ψ]] ≡ ∀p. [[φ]] ⊃ [[ψ]] ⊃ p
[[φ ∨ ψ]] ≡ ∀p.([[φ]] ⊃ p) ⊃ ([[ψ]] ⊃ p) ⊃ p
[[φ ⊃ ψ]] ≡ [[φ]] ⊃ [[ψ]]
[[∀xφ]] ≡ ∀x [[φ]]
[[∃xφ]] ≡ ∀p.(∀x [[φ]] ⊃ p) ⊃ p
This mapping can easily be turned into a mapping between two LTTs, which can be
handled by our method.
Let LTT1 be a first-order LTT with connectives not1, and1, or1, imp1, all1, ex1. Let
LTT2 be a second-order LTT with connective imp2, a first-order quantifier all2:(A:Type2)(A→
Prop2)→ Prop2, and a second-order quantifier All2:(Prop2 → Prop2)→ Prop2.
We write φ ⊃2 ψ for imp2 φ ψ, ∀2x:A.φ for all2 A [x:A]φ, and ∀2p:Prop2.φ for
All2 [p:Prop2]φ.
Let M1 and M2 be two proof scripts that declare these two LTTs.
We can write a module MRP which imports M2, and then defines every constant
declared in M1:
Type1 = Type2
Prop1 = Prop2
Prf1 = Prf2
not1 = [p:Prop1]∀q:Prop2.p ⊃2 q
and1 = [p, q:Prop1]∀r:Prop2.p ⊃2 q ⊃2 r
or1 = [p, q:Prop1]∀r:Prop2.(p ⊃2 r) ⊃2 (q ⊃2 r) ⊃2 r
imp1 = imp2
all1 = all2
ex1 = [A:Type1][P :A→ Prop1]∀2p:Prop2.(∀2x:A.Px ⊃2 p) ⊃2 p
Thus, our method of proof reuse can be applied to the Russell-Prawitz modality.
5.6. Other Applications
Our formalisation examples discussed in this paper have all concentrated on translations
that redefine the logical connectives, while leaving the world of data types unchanged.
As we mentioned above (cf., the remark at the end of Section 4), the LTT-approach to
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reuse also allows the possibility of changing the world of data types in formalisations. An
example of such is to reuse the results in the formalisation of predicative mathematics
in the formalisation of impredicative mathematics; this is studied in (Adams and Luo,
2010).
There could be further applications. Here are some possibilities.
1 Translations that redefine the type constructors.
For example, there is a translation from System T to System F described in (Girard
et al., 1990):
[[Bool]] = ΠX.X → X → X
[[Nat]] = ΠX.X → (X → X)→ X
[[A→ B]] = [[A]]→ [[B]]
[[A×B]] = ΠX.([[A]]→ [[B]]→ X)→ X
Our method of proof reuse can be applied in this case. The module declaring System
T will declare constants Bool:Type, Nat:Type, → :Type → Type → Type and
×:Type→ Type→ Type. The module MΦ will redefine these constants.
2 If we have two first-order systems S and T , and every axiom of S is a theorem of T ,
then every theorem of S is a theorem of T .
Our method of proof reuse can be applied in this case. For each axiom α of S, the
module MS will contain a constant declaration cα:Prf(α). The corresponding line in
MΦ will be a proof of α in T .
Our method does not appear able to handle interpretations between first-order the-
ories, however. An interpretation (in the sense of (Shoenfield, 1967)) between S and
T maps (e.g.) a unary function symbol f of S to a formula φ[x, y] of T such that
T ` ∀x∃!yφ[x, y].
This does not fit into the pattern of the translations above, and there is no obvious
way to adapt our method to this situation without changing the theories themselves
(e.g. by adding a unique choice operator).
6. Conclusion
We have demonstrated an original method for proof reuse when conducting formalisations
that make use of more than one LTT. For some translations Φ between an LTT S and
an LTT T , it is possible to write a module MΦ such that, if a proof script imports MS
and proves α, then changing the script to import MΦ will give a proof of Φ(α) in T .
Our case studies reported in this paper are all about the logical components. As we
have pointed out in various places in the paper that it is possible to consider translations
that change the part of data types (e.g., changing from predicative mathematics to im-
predicative mathematics). We expect further development in this respect: further cases
should be studied to investigate how such non-logical changes can be used in practice.
This method should be quite general, and applicable to work in type theories and other
systems of logic. However, if one wishes to formalise a large piece of mathematics that
involves proving results in several different foundations, then LTTs would seem to be
A Pluralist Approach to the Formalisation of Mathematics 25
particularly suitable, as they allow for a uniform presentation and treatment of a wide
range of different foundations.
For our future work, we wish to formalise one such piece of mathematics, using Plastic
and this method of proof reuse.
6.1. Related Work
There has been considerable work on proof reuse in recent years. For the most part,
this work has concentrated on the problem of allowing users of different proof assistants
to share one another’s work. This is a different problem to the one we consider in this
paper: how to formalise a piece of mathematics that involves several different foundations.
Nevertheless, the two lines of research should be able to benefit from one another.
6.1.1. Logosphere The large project Logosphere, started by Schu¨rmann, Pfenning, Kohlhase
and Owre, aims to build a large library of formalised proofs that users of many different
proof assistants can all contribute to and make use of. It does this by representing the
many different many different systems and the translations between them in the Edin-
burgh LF. In particular, Howe’s translation from HOL to NuPRL (Howe, 1996; Howe,
1998) has been formalised and verified to be correct using the proof assistant Twelf
(Schu¨rmann and Stehr, 2006).
The representation of HOL in ELF consists of a type tp:type to represent the types
of HOL, together with a function tm:tp→ type to represent the terms of each type. The
representation of Nuprl consists of a type n− tm:type to represent the terms of Nuprl.
The translation Φ is then represented by two functions
transtp:tp→ n− tm→ type transtm:tm A→ n− tm→ type
with transtp A B being inhabited iff Φ(A) = B. Twelf is able to verify that transtp
and transtm are total functions that satisfy the desired properties.
Their approach thus intended to be used to translate between two systems implemented
in two different proof checkers, using a logical framework implemented in a third. Our
approach is intended to be used by someone using just one proof checker, that implements
a logical framework.
The most important difference is that they represent the translation as a pair of objects
in the logical framework, and formally verifying its correctness. We do not represent the
translation as an object; rather, it is effected by replacing a set of declarations with a set
of definitions.
It remains to be seen how the two approaches compare in practice. However, we an-
ticipate that our approach should be more convenient for a pluralist formalisation, as
there is less overhead for the user. The translations are invisible to the user. Given a
translation Φ:S → T , when the user is working in T , there is no need for them to invoke
Φ in order to make use of the results proved in S. A change in the proof scripts produced
in S will produce an immediate change in the theorems that are visible to the user and
available for use in T .
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6.1.2. Little Theories The proof assistant IMPS is designed to use the little theories
methodology (Farmer, 2000), whereby a number of different theories and translations
between them are specified using a version of higher-order logic called LUTINS (Farmer
et al., 1990). A translation from one theory T1 to another T2 is specified by a mapping
from the constants of T1 to the expressions of T2 satisfying certain conditions, such that
the translation of every axiom of T1 is a theorem of T2.
The LTTs we have been dealing with in this paper have a richer type structure than the
theories that can be specified in LUTINS. Our LTTs include dependent types, inductive
types and computation rules. Apart from this difference, the class of translations that
can be handled by the two methods is remarkably similar.
However, IMPS required support for translations to be built into the implementation.
We have shown in this paper that, when working with a logical framework, a lightweight
mechanism for supporting these translations is automatically available for free.
The work that has been done in IMPS shows how useful it can be to work with a
variety of theories and translations in the course of a formalisation. We hope that the
programme of research proposed in this paper will prove that this remains true when we
are working in LTTs, too.
6.1.3. Other Methods of Proof Reuse The method of proof reuse between different sys-
tems of logic presented in this paper is, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, original.
Previous work on proof reuse in dependent type theories has concentrated on proof
reuse within a single type theory, in the following two specific classes of situations:
1 Given an isomorphism between types A and B, to automatically generate proofs
about B from proofs about A (Beckert and Klebanov, 2004).
2 Given an inductive type A, and an inductive type B formed by extending A with
new constructors, to reuse proofs about A to interactively generate proofs about B
(Boite, 2004).
3 The project LATIN (Iancu and Rabe, 2010) has similar aims to Logosphere.
4 Garillot and Gonthier’s method of mathematical components (Franc¸ois Garillot et al.,
2009) is a disciplined way of systematically organising the development of large for-
malisations involving many algebraic structures, in such a way that (e.g.) results
about groups can be applied to rings. This is not the same problem as the one consid-
ered in this paper, which involves translations between systems that involve changing
both the type structure and the logic. Nevertheless, there are superficial similarities,
and it remains to be seen if the two methods have anything to offer each other.
6.2. Future Work
Plastic at present has a very primitive module mechanism, which nevertheless was suffi-
cient for the work in this paper. However, the method we have presented relies on editing
proof scripts, changing the files which they import, which is very inconvenient in practice.
A more sophisticated module system that allows for parameterised modules would
make this form of proof reuse much more convenient. For our future work, we would like
to implement such a module mechanism in Plastic.
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We would also like to establish a better theoretical basis for this type of work. We would
like to establish some criteria for when a translation can be represented by a module by
our method. We would like to study the theory of modules, module interfaces and module
functors described above. The result will likely be very similar to the theory of institutions
(Goguen and Burstall, 1984); there are many superficial similarities. Institutions are not
exactly what we need, however, as institutions are a model-theoretic notion, whereas we
require a syntactic notion.
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